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ABSTRACT: The introduction of genome-wide arrays in
postnatal and prenatal diagnosis raises challenging ethical
issues. Here, we explore questions with regard to the ethics
of consent. One important issue is whether informed con-
sent for genome-wide array-based testing is in fact feasible,
given the wide range of possible outcomes and related op-
tions. The proposed alternative of “generic consent” will
have to be studied in practice. From an ethical point of
view, the question is whether consent would still be suf-
ficiently “informed” in a generic approach. Another issue
that has not yet been given much attention is how far
parents, or pregnant women and their partners, should be
allowed to determine the range of possible outcomes that
will or will not be reported back to them. The scope and
limits of parents’ and prospective parents’ right to know
or not to know are far from clear. The complex normative
issues on the content and weight of these rights can only
be answered by taking full account of the rights and in-
terests of all the parties involved: prospective and actual
parents, children, and relatives. This paper is the result of
a working group meeting preceding the European Society
of Human Genetics 2011 Conference, where these issues
were addressed.
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Introduction
Genome-wide array technology is rapidly gaining ground both in
postnatal and prenatal diagnosis. Postnatally, this mainly concerns
the clarification of unexplained intellectual disability and other het-
erogeneous conditions affecting young children [Vissers et al., 2010].
Prenatally, genome-wide arrays are increasingly being used in preg-
nancies with ultrasound abnormalities [Vetro et al., 2012], while
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proposals have also been made for using this technology as an alter-
native for karyotyping in low-risk pregnancies [Ogilvie et al., 2009].
The introduction of genome-wide arrays in these settings promises
to have far-ranging implications for clinical genetics, but also raises
challenging questions from an ethical point of view. A vexing issue
for clinical practice concerns the ethics of consent [Netzer et al.,
2009]. The question involves not just whether, or to what extent,
informed consent for genome-wide array-based testing is in fact fea-
sible, given the wide range of possible outcomes and related options
it may yield, but also to what extent parents or pregnant women and
their partners should be allowed to determine the range of possible
outcomes that will or will not be reported back to them [Dondorp
and De Wert, 2010]. This question, referring to the application in
these specific contexts of rights or presumed rights both “to know”
and “not to know,” has until now not been paid much attention.
This paper is the result of a working group meeting preceding the
European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) 2011 Conference in
Amsterdam, where these issues were addressed. In line with the na-
ture of the workshop, this paper is exploratory. It gives an overview
of ethical issues and challenges relevant to policy development in
this highly dynamic field, focusing on the contexts of postnatal and
prenatal testing. When speaking of “postnatal testing,” we mean
testing of young children. Testing of adults raises different issues
than those discussed in the workshop and in this paper. Another
theme beyond the scope of this paper is how to deal with the still
theoretical possibility of genetic findings meaningfully associated to
non-health-related traits such as intelligence, musicality, and so on.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We start out with a sep-
arate section briefly presenting the outline of the ethical concept of
“informed consent.” Corresponding to the themes of the workshop,
the next two main sections are on issues of consent in postnatal and
prenatal testing. Both are divided in three subsections. In the first of
those, we discuss the challenge of obtaining meaningful informed
consent for genome-wide array-based testing. In the second, we
discuss whether and to what extent the pretest consent procedure
should include the option for parents or pregnant women to indicate
that they do not want to be informed about specific outcomes. In
the third, the opposite issue of their right to know specific outcomes
is addressed. The final section consists of a brief conclusion.
Informed Consent
The ethical concept of “informed consent” for medical treatment
consists of two normative elements [Beauchamp and Childress,
2009]. Firstly, it requires doctors to obtain the patient’s consent
prior to initiating medical treatment (or testing). This requirement
connects to the ethical principle of respect for patient autonomy;
C© 2012 WILEY PERIODICALS, INC.
patients should be allowed to remain the authors of their own lives.
If the patient is incompetent, his or her relatives (proxies) or legally
appointed representatives must (whenever realistically possible) be
asked to decide in his or her place. However, these persons do not
then simply take over as fully autonomous decision makers. As rep-
resentatives, their role is to decide what is in the best interest of
the patient, taking account, when applicable, of what they know
about the patient’s own views and preferences. In terms of ethical
principles, proxy consent has a strong, direct link with the principle
of beneficence, and a weaker, indirect one with the principle of re-
spect for patient autonomy. Secondly, the qualification “informed”
stresses that for consent to be meaningful, it must be based on an
adequate understanding on the part of the patient or his or her
representatives of what the proposed treatment involves, what is
at stake in terms of possible burdens, benefits and drawbacks, and
how this relates to any realistically available alternatives. Accord-
ing to the norm of “informed consent”, it is the responsibility of
the professional to provide this information. This does not entail
telling the patient or his or her representative about every possible
detail, as that would undermine rather than facilitate meaningful
informed consent. Instead, the information should be tailored to
what the patient or representative needs to know in order to make a
well-informed decision. The basic criterion for this is the perspec-
tive of the “reasonable person.” Especially with regard to decisions
with possibly far-ranging consequences, professionals should invite
patients to indicate whether they would have any specific additional
information needs based on their personal values, ideals, and pref-
erences.
Parental Consent for Genome-Wide Array-Based
Testing of Children
Genome-wide array-based testing aimed at uncovering the ge-
netic basis of a child’s hitherto unexplained intellectual disability or
other complex disorder may be the only way to arrive at a diagnosis
necessary for the adequate treatment and care of that child [Vissers
et al., 2010]. If so, beneficence-based professional obligations toward
the child may justify the provision of such testing, even though it
comes at the price of possibly also generating outcomes that may
sometimes lead to difficult decision making.
As the child cannot decide upon the testing offer, the parents are
asked to give their proxy consent. Other things being equal (e.g.,
costs), it is part of their parental responsibility to consent to medical
testing that is clearly in the interests of their child [Buchanan and
Brock, 1989]. Since doctors and counselors cannot fulfill their own
duty of providing good care without the parents also being prepared
to accept their responsibility in this regard, persuading them to
consent may, if necessary, be appropriate. If the interests of the child
are at stake, nondirectiveness cannot be the final word.
Meaningful Informed Consent for Postnatal Testing
The fact that (other things being equal) parents can be expected
to consent to testing that is in the interest of their child, should
not take away the importance of properly informing them about the
nature and possible outcomes of the test. Providing this information
is a matter of taking them seriously in their role as representatives
of the best interest of their child. From an ethical point of view,
that is why professionals should always try to obtain well-informed
parental consent.
In order for their consent to be meaningful, parents must be
provided with adequate pretest information about the possible out-
comes and implications of genome-wide array-based testing. Apart
from findings that may help to resolve the clinical problem, there
may also be outcomes of unclear clinical significance and unsolicited
findings. Here we use “unsolicited findings” to refer to outcomes of
clinical significance (mutations and risk factors) that are not related
to the health problem that prompted the testing.
However, even with regard to clinically relevant findings, the
range of possible outcomes is far too wide to be able to discuss
all the possibilities prior to testing. The problem is, in part, of a
practical and economic nature; even if it were possible for medical
professionals to have a complete overview, they simply do not have
the time to provide detailed pretest information to patients, parents,
or prospective parents about every possible outcome. But there is
also a limit to the information that patients or their representatives
(in this case, the parents of the child to be tested) can be expected
to absorb, understand, and reflect upon. “Information overload”
is a serious concern, signaling that not just too little, but also too
much information may undermine well-informed decision making
[Van Zwieten, 2006].
As a solution for this problem, which arises in several contexts in
genetic testing, the model of “generic consent” has been proposed
[Elias and Annas, 1994]. This involves providing information about
generalized outcome categories and related options, instead of more
specific information across the full range of possible outcomes. The
recent proposal by Berg et al. [2011] for what they call a “binning
system for incidental findings,” seems to come close to this idea.
Whether generic consent is a feasible alternative is very much an
open question, requiring empirical research to see how this as-
yet untested model works in practice. Of course, further in-depth
ethical analysis of this concept is also required. From an ethical
point of view, the issue is whether this approach allows counselors
to steer clear of information overload, on the one hand, without
ending up with what is in fact “uninformed consent,” on the other. It
would seem that in order for generic consent for genome-wide array-
based testing to be sufficiently informed, pretest information will at
least have to differentiate between unsolicited findings with early or
late-onset health implications, and further break these down into
outcome categories accounting for level of risk, burden of disease,
and options for treatment or prevention. Parents should also be
made aware that the interpretation of certain unclear outcomes
may also require themselves to be tested, and that genome-wide
testing of their child may reveal something that affects themselves
as well as other relatives, for example, being at an increased disease
risk [Vermeesch et al., 2011].
Parental Right Not to be Informed About Specific Test
Outcomes
Another question is whether, as part of the consent procedure,
parents should be given the option of indicating that they do not
want to be informed about specific outcomes beyond those an-
swering the clinical problem prompting the test. It is generally
acknowledged that, in principle, competent adults have a right to re-
main ignorant with regard to genetic information about themselves
[Wilson, 2005]. But can parents claim “a right not to know” with
regard to certain outcomes of genome-wide array-based testing of
their child? Here, again it is important to acknowledge that they
themselves are not the patient to be tested, but his or her represen-
tatives. According to the recommendations of the ESHG, “health
care professionals have the responsibility to defend the interests of
the minor if the decision of the minor’s parents or legal guardians is
not to the direct benefit of the minor” [European Society of Human
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Genetics, 2009]. Therefore, if there is such a thing as a “parental
right not to know,” it cannot cover findings that, even though they
are unsolicited, are of clinical relevance, in the sense of requiring
treatment, prevention, or surveillance.
However, in some consent protocols for array-based testing of
children that we have seen (coming from university hospitals in
the Netherlands), parents are simply given the option of indicating
that they do not want to be informed about unsolicited findings,
with no further qualification or condition. In an article reflecting on
new challenges for informed consent arising from whole-genome
array testing, Netzer et al. [2009] also included this option in their
proposal to ask:
patients or their parents [prior to testing] whether they wish
to be informed about any additional genetic findings (with-
out direct connection to the phenotype in question) with
predictive value for the health of the proband and potentially
her/his family; [whether] they only wish to be informed about
such additional genetic findings if effective treatment options
or surveillance programmes are available; [and also whether]
they wish to be informed about a carrier status for an autoso-
mal recessive disease—that is, about a condition which may
have implications for reproductive decisions of the proband
and/or family members. [Netzer et al., 2009]
It is telling that in this quotation, the authors fail to differentiate
between what a patient may decide for himself or herself and what
parents may decide for their children. Of course, had we been speak-
ing about testing competent adults, respect for autonomy would also
have included their right to determine the scope of the information
they want to receive, regardless of whether receiving that informa-
tion would be in their best interests. But asking parents to provide
proxy consent does not come under this principle. It is not a matter
of respecting their informational privacy, but of taking them seri-
ously in their role of parents representing their children’s interests.
Giving them the option of not being informed of any clinically rele-
vant findings regarding the health of their child ignores this parental
responsibility. The issue here is not one of parental autonomy, but of
parental and professional duties of beneficence. To suggest otherwise
is to make a mockery of the principle of respect for autonomy.
With regard to unsolicited findings indicating a high risk of an
adult-onset disorder, the question is whether, on balance, the disclo-
sure of this information is in the best interest of the child. Severity
and treatability are important factors in this respect, where treatabil-
ity should be specified in terms of whether the course and burden of
the disease can be significantly altered by starting treatment and pre-
vention prior to the first symptoms. According to current guidelines,
asymptomatic children should not be tested for adult-onset disor-
ders, unless treatable in this sense [European Society for Human
Genetics, 2009]. If, for instance, a BRCA (hereditary breast cancer)
mutation is found in a girl, this information need not be acted upon
before she reaches adulthood. Since nothing can be done with this
information as long they are children, it is not in their interest to be
tested at that time. Moreover, it is felt that letting these girls grow
up knowing this information would be at odds with respecting their
future autonomy to decide for themselves about whether or not to
be tested.
However, these guidelines do not yet discuss the issue of unso-
licited findings indicating a high risk of such a disorder. Typically,
the background document to the recommendations of the ESHG
on testing asymptomatic children states that “the problem of inci-
dental findings (such as a deletion affecting BRCA1) needs to be
discussed urgently. For practical purposes, and before consensus is
reached on the reporting of incidental findings, it may be advisable
to ignore data that are not relevant for the pathology in the patient”
[Borry et al., 2009]. In anticipation of this urgently needed debate,
we think that it would be in line with the general principles behind
those same guidelines (stressing parental responsibility to always
serve the best interests of their child) to defend the following.
In the case of a test result revealing a high risk of a late-onset
disorder that is treatable in the sense indicated, and where presymp-
tomatic treatment or surveillance would have to be initiated during
childhood, parents must be informed and cannot be granted a right
not to know with regard to such outcomes. If the disease is treatable
in the sense indicated, but not yet during childhood, it may still be
in the child’s interest that the information about its being at a high
risk is kept for use at the appropriate time. Whether this would then
require informing the parents, depends on the availability of alter-
native ways for effectively safeguarding this interest, for instance, by
leaving the information “in trust” until the children are older.
As a further complication, it will often be the case that not just the
interest of the child is at stake, but also the health and/or reproductive
interests of the parents themselves and, possibly, of other relatives.
Although, in principle, the parents have a right not to be informed
about findings about themselves, this again does not overrule their
parental responsibility to be given information that reveals a serious
and treatable condition in their child. Nor can they be granted the
right to decide that the possible health and/or reproductive interests
of other family members need not be taken into account. However,
this is what the quotation from Netzer et al. [2009] seems to propose.
And in one of the consent protocols we have seen, the possibility of
opting for not to be given information about unsolicited findings is
brought up without even referring to the possible interests of wider
family members.
Parental Right to be Informed About Specific Test Outcomes
With regard to the very rare cases where, as an unsolicited out-
come of array-based testing, a high risk may be found for a severe
and untreatable late-onset disorder, the issue seems to become one
of not so much whether the parents have a right not to know, but
whether they have a right to know. If it can be expected that the
child will grow into a competent adult, revealing that he or she is at
risk of a serious, late-onset disorder infringes upon what Feinberg
has called the child’s “right to an open future” [Feinberg, 1980].
Unless there are possible benefits of presymptomatic treatment or
prevention (see above), professionals have a prima facie moral duty
not to share such findings with the parents. Prima facie means that
this duty is not absolute. Professionals should also take account of
possible harm to third parties that not conveying this information
may entail. Given the scenario of a high risk for a serious, nontreat-
able, late-onset disorder, the dilemma arises that although the child’s
relatives (including the parents) may have a strong reproduction-
related interest in this information, telling them will most certainly
also be harmful because of what this would mean for their own
health prospects. Given this moral complexity, it is not evident that
a case can be made for telling the parents against the clear inter-
ests of the child. In the light of this, the suggestion by Netzer et al.
[2009] that parents should be given the option to indicate whether
they want to receive predictive information about untreatable dis-
orders, without distinguishing between childhood and adult-onset
disorders, is at least problematic.
Of course, if the child is expected to remain incompetent as an
adult (which will be the case if testing is done to reveal the genetic
basis of serious intellectual disability), no future autonomy rights
are at stake. However, it may still be questionable whether it is in the
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child’s interest that the parents know that it is at risk of a serious,
untreatable, late-onset disorder. To the extent that this can indeed
be doubted, an unqualified parental “right to know” is still not
self-evident.
A further issue regards parents’ right to learn of outcomes of
unclear clinical significance. As a detailed discussion of this is beyond
the scope of this paper, we only make the following remarks. Where
such outcomes require further testing of the parents themselves,
they will of course have to be reported. But if no such testing is
necessary, the interests of the child should determine whether to tell
the parents or not.
Consent for Genome-Wide Array-Based Prenatal
Testing
Genome-wide array-based testing of children with an intellectual
disability or other hitherto unclarified complex condition is per-
formed with the clear aim of contributing to better care for these
children. But what precisely is the aim of using similar testing in the
prenatal context, either as follow-up to an abnormal ultrasound out-
come or as an alternative for karyotyping in low-risk pregnancies?
Here, the primary aim of such testing is to better inform pregnant
women and their partners about fetal abnormalities that they may
regard as relevant in deciding whether to let the pregnancy continue
or not. Hence the reference in the article by Vetro et al. [2012] to the
“limited timeframe” for decision making in the prenatal context due
to the laws on abortion in different countries. With this aim, we enter
a different moral landscape compared to that governing postnatal
testing. As we have seen, parents may, if necessary, be persuaded
to consent to testing that is necessary for arriving at a diagnosis of
their child’s disorder, but if testing is done to contribute to better-
informed reproductive decisions, no such directivity is acceptable. It
is not for professionals to determine whether a woman should con-
sider having an abortion. Professional nondirectiveness and value
neutrality are core values in the traditional normative framework
for prenatal diagnosis and screening [De Wert and Dondorp, 2006].
These are based on a concern that abortion decisions may otherwise
be turned into instruments for achieving professional or societal
goals such as preventing the birth of children whose health and
welfare needs will place a high financial burden on society.
However, prenatal testing may also serve the additional aim of
contributing to a better pregnancy outcome for the pregnant woman
and her future child. When offering array-based testing to clarify ab-
normal ultrasound outcomes, professionals should take account of
the moral implications of these different aims. Although they should
refrain from persuading women to consent to testing if the aim is to
contribute to better-informed abortion decisions, a directive offer
of a test may well be acceptable if it is clear that the information will
not be used for an abortion (either because the couple has indicated
that no matter what, they want to carry the pregnancy to term, or
because the legal limit for abortion has elapsed), and if the test is
expected to contribute to better prenatal and perinatal care, which
is also in the interest of the future child. This latter expectation is
of course crucial; if testing can be deferred until after birth, women
should not be persuaded to consent to prenatal testing they do not
particularly want to have.
Vetro et al. [2012] refer to the interests of the future child, but
without drawing the conclusion that where his or her interests are
clearly at stake, the traditional framework of nondirectiveness does
not apply. They say that the parents should be helped “to make their
own decision based on the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient.”
If the word “decision” in this phrase refers to decision making about
testing with a view to a possible abortion, it is unclear how this
could possibly be based on the concept of “the fetus as a patient.” If
it refers to decision making about testing that is also in the interest
of the future child, it may indeed be appropriate in a sense to speak
of the presence of a second patient. But if this is the case, how would
that not affect the responsibility of professionals to also take the
interests of that patient into account, thus limiting the scope for
nondirectiveness?
However, we do not think that formulating this in terms of “the
fetus as a patient” is very helpful [Health Council of the Netherlands,
2009]. By putting the emphasis on the supposed interests of the fetus,
this notion leads into a debate about the moral status of the unborn,
which is better left out of this discussion [Brown, 2008]. Whatever
the status of “the fetus as fetus,” it is enough to acknowledge that if
the fetus can be expected to grow into a child, the interests of this
future person should already be taken into account whenever deci-
sions are made that can be expected to affect its interests [Murray,
1987].
Meaningful Informed Consent for Prenatal Testing
As in the postnatal context, the question arises how meaningful
consent is possible in light of the wide range of possible outcomes of
genome-wide array-based testing. But the problem is even greater in
prenatal testing, at least when it is offered with the aim of enabling
informed and autonomous abortion decisions. Although a possible
lack of sufficiently informed consent of the parents for postnatal
testing is an issue of moral concern, it does not make testing the
child morally problematic, at least not as long as having the test
is in the clear interests of the child. But if the aim of testing is to
enable informed reproductive decisions, a lack of sufficiently in-
formed consent on the part of those having the test means that
this aim will not be achieved, thus undermining the moral justifi-
cation of offering such testing in the first place. Much, therefore,
depends on whether a form of generic consent or some other model
of consent for genome-wide array-based prenatal testing is pos-
sible that would indeed allow decision making to be sufficiently
informed and autonomous. Elsewhere we have suggested that in
this context, relevant categories may have to be included: congenital
lethal disorders, early- or late-onset disorders requiring intensive
medical care, early- or late-onset disorders requiring limited medi-
cal care, susceptibilities for complex disorders, conditions involving
only minor health problems, and abnormal findings with unknown
clinical implications [De Jong et al., 2011]. One problem with this
approach is that any list of categories may not sufficiently account
for the variable expression of many disorders. A further concern is
that the severity of different diseases is perceived differently between
and among professionals [Wertz and Knoppers, 2002] and pregnant
women [Bryant et al., 2010]. As indicated, the practical feasibility
of such alternative models of informed consent needs to be tested
in empirical studies.
The alternative option of using filters in order to minimize find-
ings that may be unclear or otherwise difficult to handle is perhaps
more appropriate with regard to array-based testing offered as an
alternative for karyotyping in low-risk pregnancies (screening) than
if the technology is being used for clarifying unexplained ultrasound
abnormalities (diagnosis). In the latter context, the use of platforms
with a targeted design would not only require frequent updating,
but would also risk missing abnormalities relevant to answering the
diagnostic problem [Vetro et al., 2012]. We will return to this issue
later.
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Pregnant Women’s Right Not to be Informed About Specific
Test Outcomes
On a consent form for array-based testing offered to pregnant
women with an abnormal ultrasound used in one of the Dutch
university hospitals, women can indicate whether they want to be
informed about (1) only outcomes explaining the ultrasound ab-
normality, or also (2) findings likely to lead to health effects early
in life, (3) findings likely to lead to health effects later in life, and/or
(4) findings likely to affect their own health.
If prenatal testing is offered with the aim of enabling informed
and autonomous abortion decisions, women should indeed be al-
lowed to indicate prior to testing what outcomes they would not
consider relevant to such a decision and therefore would rather not
be informed about. But the way that idea is elaborated in this pro-
tocol invites the following comments: Firstly, it seems clear that this
requires a more detailed list of possible outcomes than the rudimen-
tary one in this protocol. Secondly, it is not obvious why women
should, without allowing for further differentiation, accept to be
informed about all possible outcomes explaining the ultrasound
abnormality. Thirdly, the protocol does not indicate that there may
also be limits to the right not to know. Although, in principle, the
woman/couple has the right to indicate not to want to receive in-
formation relevant to their own health, the possibility of avoiding
serious consequences for the health and/or reproductive interests of
their relatives may limit the professional’s obligation to heed this
request [Lacroix et al., 2008]. Moreover, it should be acknowledged
that a new situation arises if the woman either decides to carry the
pregnancy to term or if the test results are only known after the legal
limit for abortion. In those cases, the interests of the future child
limit the scope for the right not to know of the parents to be. Pro-
fessionals cannot ignore test results that are important for adjusting
prenatal or perinatal care to the health interests of the future child.
As an example, one may think here of test results indicating a con-
genital heart disease that would require adapted postpartum care.
In future, one may increasingly also think of test results indicating
conditions for which prenatal treatments are available. Ethically, it
is important that professionals are aware that the moral framework
determining their responsibilities changes as soon as the interests of
the future child come into play.
Pregnant Women’s Right to be Informed About Specific
Test Outcomes
Do pregnant women and their partners also have a right to be
informed about outcomes of unclear clinical significance? A differ-
ence with postnatal testing is that due to the time constraints in
prenatal testing, the parents-to-be will usually already have been
tested as well. This makes it easier to withhold results of unclear
significance. Moreover, the range of possible results that are difficult
to interpret is even greater in the prenatal context than in the post-
natal context. Professionals are reluctant to report such results in
order not to induce unnecessary anxiety and to avoid abortions of
fetuses based on outcomes of which the exact health implications are
still unclear [Vetro et al., 2012]. Although this paternalistic stance
is understandable and may even be justified with reference to the
notion of helping pregnant women to make well-informed rather
than ill-informed reproductive decisions, there is still a tension with
the ideal of reproductive autonomy. As some women or couples may
want to have more information than others, including outcomes of
which the precise implications are still unclear, a case can perhaps
be made for addressing these preferences in the context of pretest
counseling.
A difficult dilemma arises with regard to possible outcomes in-
dicating a high risk of a serious, nontreatable, late-onset disorder.
On the one hand, the woman or the couple can be said to have a
right to this information if the knowledge of bearing a child with
this risk would be a reason to terminate the pregnancy for them.
On the other hand, if they decide to continue the pregnancy, a
child will be born with a positive predictive test for serious health
problems later in life. This may lay a cloud over its existence, af-
fect the dynamics of the parent–child relationship, and infringe its
right to make autonomous decisions about what to know or not to
know about its health prospects once mature enough to do so. That
the child is yet to be born does not change the fact that it may be
harmed by information generated during pregnancy, which would
affect its “right to an open future.” Indeed, where the interests of the
future child are at stake, “the timing of harm is irrelevant” [Murray,
1987].
The problem in question is familiar from the debate surround-
ing targeted prenatal testing for Huntington’s disease. In the case
of a positive result, most parents will choose to abort the preg-
nancy. If they do not, however, they will have a child known to be
a carrier of this extremely severe and untreatable, late-onset dis-
ease. Given the generally supported consensus that postnatal testing
of children for such conditions should not be allowed, the ques-
tion is what this should mean for prenatal diagnosis. This problem
arises for targeted prenatal testing for a number of other autoso-
mal dominant conditions as well (e.g., the hereditary and often
relatively early onset form of Alzheimer’s disease). Contrary to stan-
dard practice for prenatal diagnostic testing, the solution proposed
for updated guidelines from the International Huntington Associ-
ation is to only allow the test to be performed on the condition
that the woman indicates beforehand that she intends to abort the
pregnancy in the event of a positive result [International Hunting-
ton Association, 1994; De Wert, 2002]. Of course, conditional access
to prenatal diagnostic testing does not mean future parents can be
forced to terminate the pregnancy in the event of an unfavorable
result.
Applying this to genome-wide array-based testing, a distinction
must be made between the (possible) scenario where such testing
is offered as an alternative for karyotyping in low-risk pregnancies
(screening) and the scenario of using genome-wide arrays to clarify
abnormal ultrasound outcomes (diagnosis). We will first discuss the
options for addressing the issue in the context of prenatal screening.
By “prenatal screening” we mean the systematic offer of medical
testing to women with low-risk pregnancies, regardless of the type
of test. In this context, one may either opt for using targeted arrays
in order to avoid the detection of a predisposition for a late-onset
disorder as much as possible (with the drawback of denying women
the possibility to use this information for abortion decisions), or
allow access to nontargeted testing only to those who have expressed
their intention to choose abortion if a predisposition for a late-
onset disorder is found. Even though women cannot be forced to
stick to this intention, this approach seems, at least in theory, to
provide the optimal balance of respecting the autonomy of the
woman (in view of a possible abortion decision) and those of her
possible future child (its right to an open future). We say “in theory”
because an important difference with the use of conditional access
for the targeted prenatal diagnosis for Huntington’s disease is that
in a screening context, the pregnant women and their partners
are not familiar with the nature and burdens of the disorders in
question beforehand. As a consequence, it may be that many of
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those given conditional access eventually decide not to abort, which
would undermine the rationale of the approach, leading precisely
to the kind of violations of the child’s future autonomy that giving
conditional access was meant to avoid.
A further question regards the precise interpretation of the notion
of the child’s future autonomy rights. On maximum interpretation,
one should try to avoid the generation of all kinds of genetic infor-
mation (health as well as non-health related, causative mutations as
well as susceptibilities) that becomes relevant for the child only later
in life, except when this information will be used for an abortion de-
cision. This indeed drives the notion of the child’s “right to an open
future” ad absurdum. On a weaker interpretation, the autonomy
rights of the future child only stand in the way of generating infor-
mation about serious and high-penetrance, late-onset disorders that
are either nontreatable (e.g., Huntington’s disease) or not amenable
to treatment or prevention starting during childhood (e.g., BRCA
mutation). Following this interpretation, prenatal screening using
genome-wide arrays should either avoid such outcomes altogether
(by using filters) or give conditional access to limit the use of such
findings to make abortion decisions.
The above considerations may also be read as adding to the con-
cern that obtaining meaningful and sufficiently informed consent
for genome-wide prenatal testing will be too large a challenge to
justify offering such testing as a form of screening in the first place.
Moving on to genome-wide array-based testing for clarifying ul-
trasound abnormalities, the problem is that the solutions discussed
in the context of screening (filters, conditional access, etc.) may
stand in the way of adequately solving the diagnostic problem. This
means that the dilemma becomes even more poignant here. If solv-
ing the diagnostic problem is only possible with the use of tests that,
in rare cases, may also lead to findings violating the child’s future
autonomy, the question becomes one of defining and weighing the
different interests at stake. It does not necessarily follow from the
need to also take the interests of the future child into account that
pregnant women should be restricted in the use of tests needed to
arrive at a diagnosis for an ultrasound abnormality. But neither does
the mere presence of an abnormality justify the use of all possible
means to arrive at a clarification. The question is why and for whom
solving the diagnostic problem is regarded as so important. If the
aim is to enable an informed abortion decision, a crucial question is
whether the woman would indeed want to use a possible diagnosis
for that purpose. If she makes it clear that whatever the outcome
of the test, she would not have an abortion, the question becomes
one of whether a mere wish to know on her part or a mere medical
interest on the part of the professionals is enough to go ahead with a
test that may lead to infringing the interests of the future child. But
its relevance for a possible abortion decision need not be the only
reason for finding a diagnosis so important. At this point, the addi-
tional aim of prenatal testing may come into the picture: to the extent
that finding a diagnosis is also expected to contribute importantly to
better prenatal and perinatal care in the interests of both the woman
and her future child, the normative picture changes. In fact, the situ-
ation then becomes akin to that of genome-wide postnatal testing, as
discussed earlier in this paper, where the need to solve the diagnostic
problem in the interest of the child was seen to justify the use of a test
that may lead to unsolicited and, in part, highly problematic findings
as well.
But the fact that these different aims may both be at work here
also leads to the possibility of difficult counseling situations and
professional decision making. Although it is not in the interest of
the child to inform its parents about the unsolicited finding of a
serious, nontreatable, late-onset disorder, it may be in the interest of
a pregnant woman wanting to be able to make an informed abortion
decision not be denied this information. A possible approach is
to only provide this information if the woman has indicated in
pretest counseling that she indeed intends to ask for a termination if
confronted with this type of finding. Clearly, the same reservations
apply as raised earlier with regard to the idea of conditional access
to genome-wide prenatal screening.
Conclusion
No doubt, genome-wide arrays will be increasingly used in the
context of both postnatal and prenatal testing. They will be es-
pecially valuable for elucidating the genetic background of unex-
plained abnormalities. Even though facilitating a genetic diagno-
sis is an important advantage and, in principle, in line with the
ethical principle of beneficence, at the same time it is clear that
such genome-wide arrays raise moral questions that need ethical
scrutiny. Of particular importance is the feasibility of informed
consent, a central prerequisite of genetic testing. Generic consent
may be a sound alternative type of informed consent, but this still
has to be studied in practice. As we have shown, the scope and lim-
its of parents’ and prospective parents’ right to know and not to
know are far from clear. After considering some protocols regarding
consent procedures for genome-wide array-based testing, we have
the impression that there is a tendency to “solve” complex nor-
mative questions regarding the content and weight of these rights
by sticking to one simple principle: respect for decisional auton-
omy of the parents or prospective parents. This one-dimensional
approach, as we argue here, de facto disregards the ethical dilem-
mas at hand. Ethical analysis should take account of the rights and
interests of all the parties involved: actual or prospective parents,
children or future children, and relatives. We have pointed to some
possible directions for more adequate solutions, but obviously, fur-
ther discussion and fine-tuning is needed. Festina lente (make haste
slowly).
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